What is the value of being a superhost? by Berentsen, Aleksander et al.
HAL Id: hal-02302566
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02302566
Submitted on 1 Oct 2019
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
What is the value of being a superhost?
Aleksander Berentsen, Mariana Rojas Breu, Christopher Waller
To cite this version:
Aleksander Berentsen, Mariana Rojas Breu, Christopher Waller. What is the value of being a su-
perhost?. 68th Annual meeting of the French Economic Association, Jun 2019, Orléans, France.
￿hal-02302566￿
What is the Value of Being a Superhost?∗
Aleksander Berentsen
University of Basel and FRB St. Louis
Mariana Rojas-Breu
University of Paris Dauphine
Christopher Waller
FRB St. Louis and Deakin University
Abstract
We construct a search model where sellers post prices and produce goods of un-
known quality. A match between a buyer and a seller reveals the quality of the seller.
We look at the pricing decisions of the sellers in this environment. We then intro-
duce a rating system whereby buyers reveal the seller’s type by giving them a ‘star’ if
they are a high quality seller. We show that new sellers charge a low price to attract
buyers and if they receive a star they post a high price. Furthermore, high quality
sellers sell with a higher probability than new sellers. We show that welfare is higher
with a ratings system. Using data on Airbnb rentals to compare the pricing decisions
of Superhosts (elite rentals) to non-Superhosts we show that Superhosts: 1) charge
higher prices, 2) have a higher occupancy rate and 3) higher revenue than non-Super
hosts.
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1 Introduction
For a variety of products, buyers search for sellers of their desired goods. A critical part
of the search process is acquiring information about prices. A simple example is shopping
on the internet. Sometimes a buyer searches across individual sellers observing a single
posted price at each website. Alternatively, the buyer can go to an intermediary site where
prices from a variety of sellers are displayed. Examples include Amazon, Yelp, Flixster,
Travelocity and Airbnb.
Often the products on these sites are experience goods – the quality can only be
ascertained by consuming them. As a result, buyers would like to have an idea of the
quality of the products offered to guide their decision making. Consequently, buyers
would benefit from observing some indicator of the value of the product. One way to
do this is to have buyers give the seller a ‘rating’ about the quality of the product. If
the quality is good, the buyer gives the seller a ‘star,’ which acts as a signal to future
buyers that the seller provides a high quality products. This is a common practice on the
sites mentioned above – products get customer reviews on Amazon, restaurants, hotels
and movies receive customer satisfaction ratings on Yelp, Trip Advisor and Flixster etc.
Airbnb goes a step further by separating an elite group of rentals from all the rest by
giving them a ‘Superhost’ designation. These ratings help the buyer find better quality
products.
But what is the value of this rating for sellers? If a seller knows the quality of its
product, it can find other means to signal the quality and it does not have to rely on
previous buyers to do so. However, buyers are more likely to trust previous buyers and
find any signal from the seller to be ‘cheap talk’. It may also be the case that the sellers
themselves may not know the true quality of their product. For example, new restaurants
may not really know how good they are. The same applies for new rental properties on
Airbnb. Thus, receiving a positive rating from buyers is good for both the buyers and the
sellers.
The problem with ratings is how to get one in the first place. On sites where ratings
matter to prospective buyers, not having a rating most likely hurts seller – why go to
a seller with no rating as opposed to a seller with a high rating? So new sellers have to
provide incentives to attract buyers and get a rating. One way to do this is offer a low
price to start – this will attract customers and if the quality is good, the seller receives a
high rating. But once the seller receives the rating what is value? It seems clear that the
rating allows one to post a higher price for the good or attract even more customers. Our
objective in this paper is to model a trading environment where ratings act as a signal of
quality and study the dynamic pricing decisions of firms in such an environment.
The theoretical model is a search model where new firms do not know the quality of
2
their good. Buyers prefer higher quality to lower quality goods. Quality is only revealed
once a match occurs. We show that in a model without ratings, firms are in a pooling
equilibrium and set the same price regardless of quality. We then introduce a rating system
in which firms that are revealed as high quality producers receive a ‘star’ indicating their
type. We show that new sellers will charge a low price (relative to the pooling price) in or-
der to attract buyers. If a star is received, they then charge a higher price then the pooling
price. Thus, a rating system generates a non-degenerate price distribution. Furthermore,
firms with a star attract more customers (i.e., there is greater market tightness for high
quality goods). In equilibrium, buyers are indifferent between buying a good of unknown
quality at a low price and high probability or a high quality good at a high price but with
a low probability. Finally, we derive the welfare gains from having a rating system. Due
to free entry of sellers, sellers do not gain in equilibrium from having a ratings system
but buyers may gain or lose from a rating system. The rating system gives them more
information about who is a higher quality producer but it is costly – they pay a higher
price and face a lower probablity of obtaining a high quality good. But they also gain
from paying a lower price if they buy from an unrated seller. We show that this latter
effect dominates so a ratings sytem improves welfare..
We then compare the predictions of the model to data obtained on Airbnb pricing in
four major cities: Amsterdam, Rome, Miami and San Francisco. We compare the prices
and revenues of Superhosts to non-Superhosts, controlling for a range of factors to see if
that data supports our model. Controlling for property type, we show that Superhosts
charge higher average prices, have a higher occupancy rate and more revenue in each of
the four cities we examine.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a brief literature review. Section
3 describes the search environment and the seller’s pricing decisions, and the welfare
benefits of a rating system. Section 4 describes the data we use and presents the empirical
findings. Section 5 concludes.
2 Literature Review
The literature on experience goods began with Nelson’s (1970) description of the good and
how it differs from a pure search good. The main difference is that goods in the search
literature have observable attributes once the buyer finds a seller. With an experience
good, the buyer does not know its true quality (e..g., taste, comfort, sound or product
failure rate) until the good has been bought and consumed. A substantial literature arose
that focused on various issues on trade in experience goods such as pricing dynamics,
reputation, signalling, advertising and learning about quality. We will address a few key
papers in this literature and how it relates to our work.
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A common assumption in the literature is that the firm knows the true quality of
the good but the consumer does not. Based on the asymmetric information assumpion,
Wolinski (1983) studies a firm’s decision for choosing the quality level of its good and
the role that the price plays in signalling the quality of the good. For a given price, the
consumer expects a certain quality level. The firm faces a choice between lowering the
quality level (and costs) at the price versus the potential loss of future customers who
learn the price does not match the quality. If the potential loss of sales outweighs the cost
saving, then in equilibrium, prices reveal the correct quality levels.
A common finding in this literature is that firms have an incentive to lower the price
of their good at some point to induce consumers to acquire experience about the good
and quality discovery. Shapiro (1983) examines dynamic pricing of experience goods.
In his model, agents have an initial perception of the true quality of a good but learn
about its true quality by consuming it over time. The case most related to our paper, is
when consumers are initially ”pessimistic” about the quality of the good. In response, a
monopolist producer charges a low price to induce agents to buy the good and then raises
the price over time as consumers learn the true quality.1
The repeated nature of trades in this type of market also creates heterogeneity in con-
sumer knowledge about the quality of the product. Consequently, a monopolist producer
of a good faces two types of consumer markets – a market with experienced consumers
and a market with new consumers. Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2006) study this dynamic
pricing problem. In short, a monopolist’s current and future pricing decision affects sales
to experienced customers and the value of acquiring information by new consumers. By
charging the static monoply price, the firm maximizes current profits from experienced
customers but deters new customers from buying, thereby reducing its future customer
base. Thus, the monopolist faces a tradeoff – by lowering his current price, he loses
profits from experienced customers but lowers the cost of information acquisition for new
consumers.
There is also a substantial literature on price distributions in the search literature
based on the seminal work by Burdett and Judd (1983).2 The basic idea of these models
is that a firm can choose any price but faces a tradeoff – post a higher price and sell fewer
units or post a lower price and sell more. In equilibrium, the firm is indifferent between
these two strategies and the equilibrium price distribution is non-degenerate.
How does our paper fit into this literature? First, we differ from the existing literature
in a key way – there is no asymmetric information about the quality of the good. Producers
1A related idea comes from advertising – a firm is willing to incur a cost (lower profits) from advertising
if it induces consumers to experience the good and buy it repeatedly. After that prices can rise once the
quality of the good is revealed. See Nelson (1974) and Milgrom and Roberts (1986).
2See for example Curtis and Wright (2004), Head and Kumar (2005) and Head et al (2012)
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in our model are just as uninformed about the quality of the good as the buyer. This
eliminates any role for signaling by the producer of the good. However, there is private
information about the quality that is experienced by the buyer and the seller wants this
information communicated, which occurs via the rating the buyer gives the seller. Second,
our model is similar to these other papers in that the producer has an incentive to lower its
initial price to increase the probability of a sale. If the match reveals that the producer is
of high quality, he then can raise his price and sell more. One key difference is that we can
study the welfare gains of a rating system. To our knowledge, this is major difference with
the existing literature. Our paper differs from the search literature on price dispersion in
that we have imperfect information about the quality of the good. In our model, once
quality is revealed the seller can charge a higher price and have higher sales. Finally, most
of the papers in the economic literature are purely theoretical whereas we empirically test
the predictions of our model using AirBNB pricing data.
Finally, we want to recognize that there is a literature in the marketing and hospitality
fields regarding the role of ratings, consumer demand and particularly, pricing of Airbnb
rentals.3 This literature examines the effects of ratings on average price, forecasting of sales
or whether they have any impact at all. While most of this literature is purely empirical
in nature, Jiang and Wang (2008) and Sun (2012) are exceptions. Both papers study
static monopoly pricing in a world in which ratings convey information about quality.
Our paper differs from these papers in that is based on a theoretical search model in
which the demand a firm faces is endogenous, based on market tightness, and we study
dynamic, rather than static, pricing decisions of the seller.
3 A search model with heterogenous quality
3.1 Environment
Time is discrete and goes on forever. The economy is populated by two agent types:
buyers and sellers. Sellers produce an indivisible good at no cost, which can be of high
or of low quality. Sellers post prices and buyers, who want to consume exactly one unit
of the good, attempt to locate sellers. Matching occurs according to a matching function
specified below.
Buyers who consume the high-quality good get u = ε, where ε is drawn from a uniform
distribution with support [0, 1] and is match-specific. Buyers who consume the low-quality
good get u = 0. In a match between a buyer and a seller, the buyer first observes the value
of ε specific to the match, then the buyer decides whether he wants to acquire the good at
3Chen et al (2004) is an early example of the empirical analysis of ‘star’ rating systems on average
price and sale of Amazon products. Koomans (2018) conducts an empirical analysis of how ratings affect
pricing attributes of Airbnb rentals. However, there is no theoretical model in her paper.
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the posted price. If he agrees to the posted price, the seller produces the good and they
separate. After consumption, the buyer exits the market. We assume transferable utility.
Sellers live for two periods and can sell one unit in each period. The probability that a
seller is a high-quality seller is x. In the first period of life, the seller’s type is unknown to
both the seller and the buyer. After production, however, the type of the seller is revealed
and the buyer rates the seller. The rating is R ∈ {H,L}. We assume that the rating is
truthful.
In our environment, sellers can be in three states: unrated in their first period of
life, unrated in their second period, and rated in their second period. Without loss in
generality, we assume that sellers who receive a rating R = L exit the market, since
the rating is public information and no buyer wants to consume a low-quality good. In
accordance with the three possible states, three prices are posted. The price p0 is the price
posted by a (unrated) seller in his first period of live. The price p00 is the price posted
by an unrated seller in his second period of live, and p1 denotes the price posted by a
(high-quality) rated seller in his second period of life.
Buyers observe the three posted prices and direct their search towards one of the three
prices so that for each price there is an associated market. In each market, buyers and
sellers (who post that particular price) are matched according to a matching function
M (b, s), where b is the measure of buyers and s is the measure of sellers in a particular
market. We assume that the matching function has constant returns to scale, and is
continuous and increasing with respect to each of its arguments. The measure of buyers
is normalized to one. In contrast, the measure of sellers is determined by a free entry
condition discussed below.
Let α0 be the probability of a match for an unrated seller in the first period of his live,
α00 be the probability of a match for an unrated seller in the second period of his live and
α1 be the probability of a match for a rated seller. Accordingly, we have αi = M (si, bi) /si,
for i ∈ {0, 1, 00}. Let θi denote tightness in market i, θi is
θi = bi/si. (1)
The probability of a match for a seller in market i is
αi = m (θi) . (2)
The probability of a match for a buyer in market i is ηi = M (si, bi) /bi = M (si, bi) / (θisi).
Thus,
ηi = m (θi) /θi. (3)
As usual, tightness affects positively the probability of a match for a seller, and affects
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negatively the probability of a match for a buyer. In particular, we assume that αi (θi)
is a strictly increasing and concave function such that αi (0) = 0, αi (∞) = 1, α′i (0) > 0,
ηi (θi) = αi (θi) /θi is strictly decreasing, and ηi (0) = 1.
3.2 Agents’ decisions
In this section, we study the decisions taken by buyers and sellers. Note that there is no
private information in a match: Agents are either symmetrically uninformed about the
seller’s type (in an unrated match) or they are symmetrically informed (in a rated match).
3.2.1 Buyers’ acceptance decisions
Buyers get utility u = ε from consuming the high-quality good and utility u = 0 from
consuming the low-quality good. Since x is the probability that an unrated seller is a
high-quality seller, a buyer who is matched to an unrated seller accepts a posted price if
and only if
xε ≥ p0 or xε ≥ p00. (4)
A buyer who is matched to a rated seller accepts a posted price if and only if
ε ≥ p1. (5)
Accordingly, the expected utilities of searching in the two unrated markets are
η0
1∫
p0/x
(xε− p0) dε and η00
1∫
p00/x
(xε− p00) dε. (6)
On the left in (6), with probability η0 the buyer has a match with an unrated young seller
and the match-specific utility ε is learnt. For all ε ≥ p0/x the buyer accepts the posted
price p0 and the good is produced. The buyer then gets utility ε with the probability x
that the good is high quality minus the price p0. The term on the right in (6) has a similar
interpretation.
In the rated market the expected utility is
η1
1∫
p1
(ε− p1) dε. (7)
In (7), with probability η1 the buyer has a match with a rated seller and learns the match-
specific utility ε. For all ε ≥ p1 the buyer accepts the posted price p1 and the good is
produced. The buyer then gets utility ε with certainty since the seller is high quality,
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minus the price p1.
By taking into account the expected utilities stated in (6) and (7), buyers direct their
search towards the market that yields the highest expected utility.
3.2.2 Sellers’ price posting decisions
In the unrated market, buyers accept a trade if (4) holds, and in the rated market, they
accept a trade if (5) holds. Accordingly, the sellers’ value functions in the three markets
are, respectively,
V0 = α0
1∫
p0/x
dε (p0 + xV1) +
1− α0 1∫
p0/x
dε
V00, (8)
V1 = α1
1∫
p1
dεp1 = α1 (1− p1) p1, (9)
and
V00 = α00
1∫
p00/x
dεp00 = α00x (1− p00/x) p00/x. (10)
In (8) the expected value of being an unrated seller in the first period of life is as follows.
With probability α0 this seller is matched with a buyer and the value of ε becomes known.
Then the seller is paid the price p0 if the buyer gets a non-negative expected payoff;
i.e., for all ε ∈ [p0/x, 1]. If the good produced is high quality (with probability x) the
seller receives a rating R = H and enters the rated market in the following period, with
associated expected payoff V1. If the good produced is low quality (with probability 1−x)
the seller receives a rating R = L and exits the economy. If the seller in the first period
of life has a match that yields a low value of ε or does not have a match, the seller
remains unrated and enters the unrated market for sellers in their second period of life,
with associated expected payoff V00. Equations (9) and (10) have similar interpretations,
except that both rated sellers and unrated old sellers exit the economy with certainty after
participating in the respective markets, since they are all in their second period of life.
In each state i = {0, 00, 1} the sellers choose price pi in order to maximize their life-
time utility; i.e. they chose pi such that the right hand-sides of (8)-(10) are maximized.
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The first-order conditions on p0, p1, and p00 are, respectively,
p0 = (x/2) [1− (V1 − V00/x)] , (11)
p1 = 1/2, (12)
and
p00 = x/2. (13)
Replacing p1 in (9) and p00 in (10), we obtain the following expressions for the value
functions
V1 = α1/4 and V00 = xα00/4. (14)
Using (14), we can rewrite (11) as follows
p0 =
x [1− (α1 − α00) /4]
2
. (15)
If the arrival rates for old rated and unrated sellers are equal; i.e., α1 = α00, then p0 = p00
and all unrated sellers set the same price. However, if old rated sellers face higher arrival
rates than unrated sellers; i.e., α1 > α00, then p0 < p00 = x/2, and the price set by
unrated sellers is lower.
3.3 Rating Equilibrium
3.3.1 Free entry condition
As usual, the free entry condition is V0 = k, where k is a fixed utility cost of entering the
market. The value function V0 simplifies as follows
V0 = α0x (1− p0/x)2 + xα00/4. (16)
Then free entry implies
k = α0x (1− p0/x)2 + xα00/4.
Using (11) to replace p0 we get
k = α0x [1 + (α1 − α00) /4]2 /4 + xα00/4, (17)
an equilibrium equation in the arrival rates for sellers.
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3.3.2 Buyers’ directed search
Buyers observe prices set as in (12), (13), and (15). Moreover, they correctly anticipate
the queue length in each market and direct their search to the market which promises
the highest expected utility. In equilibrium, they must be indifferent between the three
options. From (6) and (7), buyers are indifferent if
η0
1∫
p0/x
(xε− p0) dε = η00
1∫
p00/x
(xε− p00) dε = η1
1∫
p1
(ε− p1) dε. (18)
Using (12) and (13), the second equality of (18) simplifies to
η1 = η00x. (19)
Thus, if x < 1, for a buyer the probability of a match is smaller in the rated market than
in the unrated one. From (18), buyers’s expected utility is η1/8 = η00x/8 since p00 = x/2
and p1 = 1/2.
The first equality of (18) can be written as follows
η0 (1− p0/x)2 = η00 (1− p00/x)2 .
Using (11) and (13), this expression can be simplified as
η0 [1 + (α1 − α00) /4]2 = η00. (20)
The following Lemma characterises prices and matching probabilities across markets.
Lemma 1 In any equilibrium with x < 1, prices satisfy p1 > p00 > p0 and matching
probabilities satisfy α1 > α0 > α00 (or η1 < η0 < η00). For x = 1, we have p1 = p00 = p0
and α1 = α0 = α00 (or η1 = η0 = η00).
Proof. From (19), for a buyer, the probability of a match is smaller in the rated market
than in the unrated one if x < 1. Accordingly, θ1 > θ00; i.e., the ratio of buyers to sellers
is larger in market 1 than in market 00. This implies that α1 > α00 if x < 1. Then, (15)
yields p0 < p00 = x/2 < p1 = 1/2. From (20), since α1 > α00 it follows that η0 < η00,
which implies that θ0 > θ00 and therefore α0 > α00. If x = 1, then from (19) we have
η1 = η00 and so α1 = α00 implying that p0 = p00 = p1 = 1/2 and η0 = η00.
Lemma 1 shows that in any equilibrium the arrival rate for rated sellers is higher than
the arrival rate for unrated ones, and that the arrival rate for unrated sellers in their first
period of life is higher than the arrival rate for unrated sellers in their second period of
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life. Furthermore, we find that rated sellers post a higher price than unrated ones, and
unrated sellers in their first period of life post the lowest price. In particular, they post a
lower price than the unrated sellers in their second period of life. This shows that sellers
attempt to get a rating even when they are unaware of their type.
With the above equations, we are able to compute the equilibrium as stated in the
following definition.
Definition 1 A rating equilibrium are prices pi and tightnesses θi, for i ∈ {0, 1, 00} that
solve (12), (13), (15), (17), (19), and (20).
Proposition 1 There is xˆ < 1 such that if x ≥ xˆ, then a rating equilibrium with θi > 0
and pi > 0 for all i exists and is unique. In this equilibrium welfare is decreasing in k.
Proof. See Appendix.
From Proposition 1, if the average quality of sellers x is sufficiently high there is a
unique solution for tightnesses θ1, θ0 and θ00 that define the rating equilibrium. To un-
derstand why, notice first from (19) that for a given x tightnesses θ1 and θ00 are positively
correlated, meaning that the sellers’ matching probabilities α1 and α00 are also positively
correlated. The free-entry condition for sellers (17) then implies that, for a given entry
cost k, if tightness θ00 decreases, then α00 and α1 decrease, and hence for sellers to enter
the market it must be that θ0 increases so that α0 increases as well. Therefore, the sellers’
free-entry condition (17) defines a negative relationship between θ0 and θ00. From (20),
for buyers to be indifferent between the market of unrated sellers in their first period of
life and the market of unrated sellers in their second period of life, if θ00 increases and
hence η00 decreases it must be that η0 [1 + (α1 − α00) /4]2 decreases as well. However, a
decrease in η00 may be offset by a decrease in η0 or by a decrease in (α1 − α00), depending
on the elasticity of the function αi. If x is sufficiently high, (19) implies that α1 and α00,
as well as the respective elasticities, are sufficiently close so that the overall elasticity of
(α1 − α00) is relatively small. In that case, (20) unambiguously defines a positive relation-
ship between η00 and η0, and hence a positive relationship between θ00 and θ0. Therefore,
equations (17) and (20), together with (19), yield a unique solution for tightnesses θ0, θ00,
and θ1 which in turn from (15) determine p0.
Proposition 1 also states that for x ≥ xˆ an increase in the entry cost k is welfare
worsening, because buyers’ expected utility of searching decreases with k (sellers’ expected
utility is always zero in equilibrium). Intuitively, a greater entry cost deters sellers’ entry
and thereby for a given price reduces the buyers’ matching probability.
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3.3.3 Do sellers want to be rated?
So far we have assumed that it is public knowledge if a seller has sold a unit. Suppose
now that a seller can opt out from being rated but he still posts the same prices as all
other sellers. Would he opt out? In the first period of his life he gets the same matching
probability and charges the same price as all other agents. However his continuation payoff
is different since by hiding this information he can go to the unrated market even if he is
a low-quality seller. Accordingly, his life-time utility denoted by V¯0 is
V¯0 = α0
1∫
p0/x
p0dε+ V00 (21)
Using (14), (21) becomes
V¯0 = α0 (1− p0/x) p0 + xα00/4 (22)
Comparing the equilibrium expected payoff in (16) with V¯0, it follows that the seller
has no incentive to opt out if (1− p0/x) ≥ p0/x which simplifies to p0 ≤ x/2. From
(15), p0 ≤ x/2 holds if α00 ≤ α1, which is the case in equilibrium. Therefore, the rating
system is incentive-compatible: sellers prefer taking the chance of getting a rating that
reveals their quality even at the risk of exiting the market before their second period of
life. Notice that incentive compatibility holds irrespective of the value of x. The reason is
that, even if x is relatively low and hence the chance for sellers of being of high quality is
small, a low x also means that the price that sellers can charge in the unrated market is
also low compared to the price that they can charge in the rated market. Therefore sellers
are better off by seeking to get a rating for all values of x.
3.4 Equilibrium in the absence of ratings
Here we calculate the equilibrium in the absence of ratings to see whether ratings improve
the allocation. The free entry condition implies that for sellers nothing changes. However,
buyers can be better or worse off in the absence of ratings. The only equilibrium for old
sellers is pooling since there is no cost of producing the goods and so there can be no
separating equilibrium.
In the absence of ratings, there are only two states, and hence two value functions
V˜0 and V˜1 for old and young sellers, respectively, where the tilde is used to indicate the
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variables in the economy without ratings. These value functions are
V˜0 = α˜0
1∫
p˜0/x
dεp˜0 + V˜1
and,
V˜1 = α˜1
1∫
p˜1/x
dεp˜1 = α˜1x (1− p˜1/x) p˜1/x.
By combining the two equations above we can rewrite V˜0 as follows
V˜0 = α˜0x (1− p˜0/x) p˜0/x+ α˜1x (1− p˜1/x) p˜1/x
The first-order conditions for p˜0 and p˜1 that follow from maximizing V˜0 and V˜1 are
p˜0 = p˜1 = x/2
Therefore, the free entry condition implies that
k = V˜0 = α˜0x/4 + α˜1x/4. (23)
Buyers must be indifferent between the two markets, hence the following condition must
hold
η˜0
1∫
p˜0/x
(xε− p˜0) dε = η˜1
1∫
p˜1/x
(xε− p˜1) dε
Since the prices p˜0 and p˜1 are equal, the probabilities η˜0 and η˜1 are also equal, and therefore
tightness in the market for young sellers θ˜0 equals tightness in the market for old sellers
θ˜1. Using (23), this implies that
α˜0 = α˜1 = 2k/x.
In order to compare welfare in the economy without ratings with welfare in the economy
with ratings, we rewrite equation (17) to obtain
4k
x
− α0 [1 + (α1 − α00) /4]2 − α00 = 0
where α1 > α00 and α0 > α00. Therefore α00 < (4k/x) /2 = 2k/x. Comparing α00 with
α¯0, we have that α00 < α¯0 = 2k/x, which implies that θ00 < θ¯0 and therefore η00 > η¯0. In
addition, recall that p00 = x/2, so that p00 = p¯0 = x/2. Since the matching probability
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for buyers is higher in market 00 in the economy with ratings than in market 0 in the
economy without ratings, while the price and the probability of acquiring a high-quality
good are identical in both cases, buyers’ utility is higher in the former case. Since buyers’
utility is the same across markets within the same economy, it follows that buyers are
better off in the economy with ratings. The following proposition summarises this result.
Proposition 2 In an economy with ratings welfare is higher than in an economy without
ratings.
4 Price setting and market tightness on Airbnb
We illustrate the model presented in Section 3 with data from Airbnb, an online platform
for rentals that allows hosts and guests to be matched. Hosts can post their listings, and
guests can search for rentals that best suit their preferences. As part of its intermediation
services, Airbnb encourages guests to rate their trip experiences on a 1-5 scale and leave
reviews. The average star rating and the reviews are then made visible online for each
listing.
We use data on 4 major cities: Amsterdam, Rome, Miami and San Francisco. Inspect-
ing these cities is interesting because they are all highly touristic and, at the same time,
they allow us to see whether the predicted patterns hold in sufficiently diverse locations.
The key aspect of the data that we explore is the role of the superhost status that hosts
may acquire through Airbnb. The superhost status can be interpreted as a label that
high-quality sellers acquire based on their selling experience. There are four requirements
that hosts must meet to become a superhost on Airbnb. First, superhosts must not cancel
reservations, unless there are extenuating circumstances. Second, superhosts must main-
tain a response rate of at least 90% when they are contacted by guests. Third, superhosts
must receive 5 stars in at least 80% of their reviews, and they must receive reviews by
no less than half of their guests.4 Finally, superhosts must host at least 10 trips in the
past year. In exchange for meeting the above criteria, an important benefit of becoming
a superhost is the “Superhost badge” delivered by Airbnb. This badge appears on the
superhost’ profile and listing pages and precisely certifies that the host has complied with
the superhost’ requirements.
The dataset contains key variables with one value for each rental listed on Airbnb.
These variables are computed on a yearly basis: average daily rate over the last twelve
months, number of bookings in the last twelve months, occupancy rate over the last twelve
months, and annual revenue. The dataset also contains information about the physical
4The minimum rating requirement has been updated by Airbnb recently, but it was computed as
described at the moment the data was collected.
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characteristics of the rentals such as the number of bedrooms, the number of bathrooms,
the maximum number of guests, and the neighborhood. The variables that are informative
about the quality of the rental (the cumulative overall rating, the superhost status, and the
number of reviews) are unfortunately only available for the last date at which the rental
was located on the Airbnb website. Therefore this data allows us to make a cross-sectional
comparison among the rentals.5
We restrict the sample as follows. We keep only listings that are entire apartments,
and drop houses, villas, bungalows, bed & breakfasts, etc., as well as shared or private
rooms.6 We drop a small number of rentals that appear to have 0 bathrooms. We drop
observations for which the average daily rate is missing or is higher than 3 standard
deviations, or those with missing superhost status, neighborhood, or city in the case of
the metropolitan areas of Miami and San Francisco.7 Finally, we restrict attention to
rentals with at least 10 bookings which are most likely run as a professional activity or
business, compared to rentals that only host a few trips per year. This allows us to exclude
rentals which target only dates in high season or specific events in the city since their rates
could be disproportionately high. This leaves us with 4709 observations for Amsterdam,
4183 for Rome, 2073 for San Francisco, and 4272 for Miami.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics. Rentals’ characteristics (≥ 10 bkngs)
Amsterdam Rome San Francisco Miami
1 bedroom 57.9% 46.6% 47.1% 45.9%
2 bedrooms 28.1% 33.4% 25.6% 26.8%
1 bathroom 86.6% 71.4% 82.6% 70.1%
2 guests max. 45.9% 14.5% 36.2% 16.0%
3 guests max. 11.8% 11.3% 12.3% 12.7%
4 guests max. 35.3% 36.5% 28.3% 37.5%
Source: Authors’ calculations from AIRDNA data
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on the rentals’ physical characteristics for the
5For most rentals, the last date at which information was collected is July 2016 (once we restrict
the dataset as described below, these rentals represent 63.6% in Amsterdam, 80.9% in Rome; 63% in
San F., and 64% in Miami). For the remaining rentals, the last information is older than July 2016,
presumably because these rentals were no longer active as of this date (although the last information on
almost all rentals was collected between January 1, 2016, and mid-July, 2016; the percentages are 94.7%
for Amsterdam, 98% for Rome, 95.4% for San F., and 97.5% for Miami). Notice that we need to keep these
rentals in our sample in order to take into account the prices set by hosts whose rentals are presumably
low quality and exit the market.
6In terms of listing type, entire homes or apartments represent 80.5% of observations in Amsterdam,
67.1% in Rome, 54.3% in San Francisco, and 70.3% in Miami. In terms of property type, apartments
represent 81.3% of observations in Amsterdam, 73.9% in Rome, 52.2% in San Francisco, and 65.5% in
Miami.
7For Miami there is no information about neighborhood.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics (≥ 10 bkngs)
mean sd min max
Amsterdam (4709 obs.)
average daily rate 163.1 61.7 44.6 415.0
occupancy rate 0.65 0.20 0.09 1
nr bookings 26.3 19.1 10 138
annual revenue 15871 11606 1653 140894
Rome (4183 obs.)
average daily rate 140.5 60.9 34.4 447.0
occupancy rate 0.57 0.19 0.08 1
nr bookings 34.6 22.7 10 147
annual revenue 17170 11147 565 88811
San Francisco (2073 obs.)
average daily rate 233.3 117.7 39.2 980.0
occupancy rate 0.69 0.18 0.09 1
nr bookings 31.9 22.4 10 143
annual revenue 29788 22807 1242 208296
Miami (4272 obs.)
average daily rate 191.4 103.0 42.1 842.9
occupancy rate 0.59 0.18 0.10 1
nr bookings 26.8 18.3 10 134
annual revenue 21146 13506 1315 142576
Source: Authors’ calculations from AIRDNA data
resulting sample. In the four cities most rentals have 1 bedroom and 1 bathroom, and
can host a maximum of 2 guests (Amsterdam and San Francisco) or 4 guests (Rome and
Miami). Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on the average daily rate, the occupancy
rate, the number of bookings and the revenue for the past year (the average daily rate
and the annual revenue are computed in U.S. dollars for the four cities.)
Table 3 presents the fraction of superhosts in our sample that goes from 10.3% in
Miami to 17.8% in San Francisco, and is thus similar across the four cities.8
The model presented in Section 3 predicts that old or experienced high-quality sellers,
that we see as being the superhosts in the Airbnb sample, charge higher prices, have
a higher probability of sale, and earn a higher revenue. In order to see whether these
predictions hold, we compare superhosts and non-superhosts based on their average daily
rates, their occupancy rates, and their annual revenue. First, we make a comparison
between superhosts and non-superhosts without controlling for rentals’ characteristics.
8Considering the same sample before excluding rentals with less than 10 bookings in the past year, we
have 8.4% of superhosts in Amsterdam (out of 10604 obs.), 9.5% in Rome (out of 6784 obs.), 10.4% (out
of 4295 obs.) in San Francisco and 6.0% (out of 10329 obs.) in Miami.
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Table 3: Fraction of superhosts (≥ 10 bkngs)
superhosts (%) non-superhosts (%)
Amsterdam (4709 obs.) 15.1 84.9
Rome (4183 obs.) 14.0 86.0
San Francisco (2073 obs.) 17.8 82.2
Miami (4272 obs.) 10.3 89.8
Source: Authors’ calculations from AIRDNA data.
Table 4: Superhosts and non-superhosts (≥ 10 bkngs)
Superhost Non-superhost Diff. Superhost Non-superhost Diff.
(mean) (mean) (mean) (mean)
Amsterdam San Francisco
avge. daily rate 168.2 162.2 6.0∗ 239.5 232.0 7.5
occupancy rate 0.69 0.64 0.05∗∗∗ 0.74 0.68 0.06∗∗∗
nr bookings 30.2 25.6 4.69∗∗∗ 39.3 30.4 9.0∗∗∗
ann. revenue 19061 15304 3757∗∗∗ 37521 28113 9407∗∗∗
obs. 711 3998 4709 369 1704 2073
Rome Miami
avge. daily rate 141.4 140.4 1.0 177.8 192.9 -15.1∗∗
occupancy rate 0.66 0.56 0.11∗∗∗ 0.66 0.58 0.08∗∗∗
nr bookings 43.6 33.1 10.55∗∗∗ 32.5 26.1 6.34∗∗∗
ann. revenue 22937 16235 6702∗∗∗ 24804 20728 4077∗∗∗
obs. 584 3599 4183 438 3834 4272
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001
Source: Authors’ calculations from AIRDNA data
Table 4 presents the average daily rate, the occupancy rate, and the annual revenue for all
rentals in our restricted sample, sorted by superhost status. The number of bookings in
the last twelve months is also presented. In all cities, superhosts earn on average a higher
annual revenue than non-superhosts. The reason is that the average number of bookings
per year is considerably higher for superhosts, while their average daily rate is higher or
sufficiently similar.
The overall rating (average number of stars) and the average number of reviews received
by superhosts and non-superhosts are presented in Table 5 (for the same subset of rentals
as in previous tables). Consistently with the superhosts’ requirements, the average values
of these two variables are systematically higher for superhosts. Table 5 also presents hosts’
average response time and average response rate. As expected, superhosts are more prone
to respond and respond faster to their guests than non-superhosts. In addition, superhosts
include more photos in their listings than non-superhosts.
In order to control for specific characteristics of the rentals, we run standard OLS
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Table 5: Superhosts and non-superhosts (≥ 10 bkngs)
Superhost Non-superhost Diff. Superhost Non-superhost Diff.
(mean) (mean) (mean) (mean)
Amsterdam San Francisco
overall rating 4.85 4.59 0.27∗∗∗ 4.86 4.63 0.23∗∗∗
nr reviews 39.0 24.5 14.5∗∗∗ 55.0 34.3 20.7∗∗∗
resp. rate 97.5 92.7 4.8∗∗∗ 98.1 91.9 6.2∗∗∗
resp. time (min) 186.5 269.3 -82.8∗∗∗ 134.6 242.7 -108.1∗∗∗
nr photos 20.6 17.8 2.8∗∗∗ 20.2 17.2 3.0∗∗∗
obs. 711 3998 4709 369 1704 2073
Rome Miami
overall rating 4.8 4.5 0.3∗∗∗ 4.83 4.47 0.36∗∗∗
nr reviews 55.4 34.1 21.3∗∗∗ 36.7 21.8 14.9∗∗∗
resp. rate 99.1 96.6 2.5∗∗∗ 98.6 92.5 6.0∗∗∗
resp. time (min) 65.9 124.5 -58.6∗∗∗ 62.3 196.8 -134.5∗∗∗
nr photos 29.1 25.5 3.6∗∗∗ 25.8 22.3 3.4∗∗∗
obs. 584 3599 4183 438 3834 4272
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001
Source: Authors’ calculations from AIRDNA data
regressions for each of the four cities. We set as dependent variables the average daily rate
(in log), the occupancy rate in the last twelve months and the annual revenue (in log).
Notice that annual revenue is not mechanically implied by the occupancy rate and the
average daily rate because it also depends on the number of bookings and the number of
reservation days per booking. Our aim is to test whether the coefficient associated with
superhost status is statistically significant. In the regressions we include as controls the
following individual characteristics: size of the apartment (number of bedrooms, number
of bathrooms, maximum number of guests), overall rating, number of photos in the listing,
number of reviews, and dummies for the neighborhood and city where rentals are located.
Since number of bedrooms, number of bathrooms, and maximum number of guests are
highly correlated, we drop the number of bedrooms and/or the number of bathrooms.
Airbnb’ hosts can enable the “instant book” option that allows guests to directly book a
rental through the platform (which checks for availability for the required dates) without
prior contact with the host. Since this option may allow hosts to post higher prices and
get more bookings similarly as the superhost status, we include it in the regression.
With these regressions, we confirm that the superhost status is closely linked to hosts’
pricing decisions and their probability of receiving trips. Tables 6-8 present results for
Amsterdam (the tables for the other cities are presented in the appendix). The coefficient
for superhost status is statistically significant in the regression with the average daily
rate earned by hosts as the dependent variable. The size of the apartment (maximum
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Table 6: Amsterdam. Dependent variable: average daily rate (log) (≥ 10 bkngs)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bathrooms 0.185∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗
(0.0145) (0.0144) (0.0142) (0.0142) (0.0139) (0.0139)
Max Guests 0.133∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗
(0.00325) (0.00325) (0.00325) (0.00327) (0.00321) (0.00321)
superhost 0.0706∗∗∗ 0.0430∗∗∗ 0.0341∗∗ 0.0522∗∗∗ 0.0521∗∗∗
(0.0107) (0.0109) (0.0108) (0.0107) (0.0107)
Overall Rating 0.112∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗
(0.0117) (0.0116) (0.0114) (0.0115)
Number of Photos 0.00377∗∗∗ 0.00448∗∗∗ 0.00447∗∗∗
(0.000393) (0.000389) (0.000389)
Number of Reviews -0.00150∗∗∗ -0.00151∗∗∗
(0.000110) (0.000111)
instantbook 0.0148
(0.0112)
Constant 4.338∗∗∗ 4.332∗∗∗ 3.616∗∗∗ 3.651∗∗∗ 3.684∗∗∗ 3.669∗∗∗
(0.118) (0.118) (0.158) (0.157) (0.154) (0.154)
Observations 4701 4701 4612 4612 4612 4612
Adjusted R2 0.421 0.426 0.442 0.453 0.474 0.474
Standard errors in parentheses
These are OLS regressions. Each regression controls for neighborhood.
Source: Authors’ calculations from AIRDNA data
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001
number of guests and number of bathrooms), the overall rating, and the number of photos
included in the listing also have statistically significant positive coefficients (the coefficient
for the instant book option is not statistically significant). The coefficient on the number
of reviews is negative and statistically significant although it is economically small. A
drawback with the number of reviews is that it is highly correlated with the number of
bookings (the unconditional correlation is more than 0.7 in the four cities). Therefore the
negative coefficient of this variable is capturing the negative correlation, all other things
being equal, between number of bookings and rates. In the other cities, regressions give
similar results. However, in Rome and Miami, once we include overall rating as predictor
the coefficient for superhost status becomes non-significant in some specifications. This is
natural, since the roles of overall rating and the superhost status overlap to a large extent.
Table 7 displays the regression with the occupancy rate in the last twelve months as
the dependent variable for Amsterdam. While controlling for the size of the apartment,
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Table 7: Amsterdam. Dependent variable: occupancy rate (≥ 10 bkngs)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bathrooms 0.0489∗∗∗ 0.0501∗∗∗ 0.0519∗∗∗ 0.0483∗∗∗ 0.0474∗∗∗ 0.0458∗∗∗
(0.0109) (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0107) (0.0107)
Max Guests 0.0138∗∗∗ 0.0160∗∗∗ 0.0210∗∗∗ 0.0202∗∗∗ 0.0169∗∗∗ 0.0170∗∗∗
(0.00280) (0.00280) (0.00288) (0.00288) (0.00288) (0.00287)
logadr -0.209∗∗∗ -0.217∗∗∗ -0.234∗∗∗ -0.240∗∗∗ -0.218∗∗∗ -0.220∗∗∗
(0.0108) (0.0108) (0.0110) (0.0111) (0.0112) (0.0112)
superhost2 0.0576∗∗∗ 0.0419∗∗∗ 0.0394∗∗∗ 0.0288∗∗∗ 0.0286∗∗∗
(0.00789) (0.00814) (0.00815) (0.00815) (0.00812)
Overall Rating 0.0615∗∗∗ 0.0588∗∗∗ 0.0549∗∗∗ 0.0622∗∗∗
(0.00881) (0.00882) (0.00875) (0.00884)
Number of Photos 0.00117∗∗∗ 0.000698∗ 0.000649∗
(0.000299) (0.000300) (0.000299)
Number of Reviews 0.000820∗∗∗ 0.000778∗∗∗
(0.0000854) (0.0000856)
instantbook 0.0432∗∗∗
(0.00850)
Constant 1.415∗∗∗ 1.443∗∗∗ 1.038∗∗∗ 1.071∗∗∗ 0.975∗∗∗ 0.936∗∗∗
(0.0989) (0.0985) (0.125) (0.125) (0.124) (0.124)
Observations 4701 4701 4612 4612 4612 4612
Adjusted R2 0.091 0.101 0.111 0.114 0.131 0.136
Standard errors in parentheses
These are OLS regressions. Each regression controls for neighborhood.
Source: Authors’ calculations from AIRDNA data
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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the price (average daily rate in log), the overall rating and the number of photos, the
coefficient on the superhost status is positive and statistically significant. As expected,
the coefficients for the maximum number of guests, the overall rating, the number of
photos, the number of reviews and the instant book option are all positive, and the one
for the price is negative, and all are statistically significant.
Table 8: Amsterdam. Dependent variable: annual revenue (log) (≥ 10 bkngs)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bathrooms 0.210∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗
(0.0330) (0.0326) (0.0328) (0.0325) (0.0292) (0.0290)
Max Guests 0.139∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗
(0.00743) (0.00736) (0.00751) (0.00750) (0.00673) (0.00669)
superhost 0.256∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗
(0.0242) (0.0251) (0.0248) (0.0224) (0.0223)
Overall Rating 0.0905∗∗∗ 0.0578∗ 0.0413 0.0702∗∗
(0.0269) (0.0266) (0.0239) (0.0241)
Number of Photos 0.0111∗∗∗ 0.00741∗∗∗ 0.00719∗∗∗
(0.000901) (0.000816) (0.000812)
Number of Reviews 0.00769∗∗∗ 0.00753∗∗∗
(0.000231) (0.000231)
instantbook 0.172∗∗∗
(0.0234)
Constant 8.605∗∗∗ 8.584∗∗∗ 7.570∗∗∗ 7.673∗∗∗ 7.505∗∗∗ 7.331∗∗∗
(0.270) (0.267) (0.365) (0.359) (0.322) (0.321)
Observations 4701 4701 4612 4612 4612 4612
Adjusted R2 0.167 0.186 0.192 0.217 0.370 0.377
Standard errors in parentheses
These are OLS regressions. Each regression controls for neighborhood.
Source: Authors’ calculations from AIRDNA data
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001
From table 8, being superhost is associated with a higher revenue, with statistically
significant coefficients (at the 1% level) in all specifications. Economically, the correlation
is large even in the specification that includes size of the rental, overall rating, number of
photos, number of reviews and the instant book option. All other things being equal, being
superhost is associated with earning a revenue that is typically more than 10% higher.
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5 Conclusion
We have presented a search model where ratings allow buyers to get informed about the
quality of goods. The ratings affects the sellers’ pricing behavior, since they optimally
set prices in order to maximize the chances of getting a rating. We have illustrated our
model with Airbnb data, and shown that the correlations between prices, revenue and
probability across Airbnb rentals are those predicted by our theoretical model. Possible
extensions in future research include studying richer rating settings such as double-sided
ratings systems, where ratings are posted both by sellers and buyers.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. In the first part of the proof, we prove the existence and
uniqueness of the rating equilibrium for x ≥ xˆ with xˆ < 1. In the second part of the proof,
we show that in this rating equilibrium welfare decreases with k.
Equilibrium tightnesses solve (17)-(20), which we restate here for ease of reference:
k − α0x [1 + (α1 − α00) /4]2 /4− xα00/4 = 0 (24)
η1 − η00x = 0 (25)
η0 [1 + (α1 − α00) /4]2 − η00 = 0 (26)
Recall that (24) is the free-entry condition by sellers, (25) is the buyers’ indifference
condition between market 00 and market 1, and (26) is the buyers’ indifference condition
between market 0 and market 00. From (25), tightnesses θ1 and θ00 move in the same
direction. Thus, θ1 (θ00) is an increasing function of θ00. We can then express everything
in terms of θ0 and θ00 as follows
4k/x− α0 (θ0) {1 + [α1 (θ1 (θ00))− α00 (θ00)] /4}2 − α00 (θ00) = 0 (27)
η0 (θ0) {1 + [α1 (θ1 (θ00))− α00 (θ00)] /4}2 − η00 (θ00) = 0 (28)
Equations (27) and (28) define both a relationship between θ00 and θ0. To prove the
existence and uniqueness of a solution for θ00 and θ0, we proceed as follows. First, we show
that equation in (27) defines θ0 as a monotonically decreasing function of θ00. Second, we
show that equation (28) defines θ0 as a monotonically increasing function of θ00. Third,
we show that the curve defined in equation (27) has a greater intercept value of θ0 (for
θ00 = 0) than the curve defined in equation (28). We then conclude that the two curves
have a unique intersection for θ0, θ00 > 0.
Denote the slope of the function θ0 (θ00) implicit in (27) as dθ0/dθ00 and the slope of
the function θ0 (θ00) implicit in (28) as dˆθ0/dˆθ00. By using the implicit function theorem,
we totally differentiate (27) to obtain
dθ0
dθ00
= −−2Aα0 [α
′
1 (dθ1/dθ00)− α′00] /4− α′00
−α′0A2
where A = 1 + (α1 − α00) /4 and 1 < A < 5/4 since α1 > α00. Rearranging, this equation
can be rewritten as
dθ0
dθ00
= −Aα0α
′
1 (dθ1/dθ00) /2 + α
′
00 (1−Aα0/2)
α′0A2
. (29)
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In (29), the denominator and the numerator are both positive. It follows that dθ0/dθ00 < 0
for all θ00 in (29); hence (27) defines θ0 as a monotonically decreasing function in θ00.
Next, consider equation (28), that we rewrite as follows
α0θ00 [1 + (α1 − α00) /4]2 − α00θ0 = 0. (30)
We totally differentiate (30) to get
dˆθ0
dˆθ00
= −α0A
2 + A2 θ00α0 [α
′
1 (dθ1/dθ00)− α′00]− α′00θ0
α′0θ00A2 − α00
. (31)
The denominator at the right-hand side of (31) can be rewritten as θ00
(
α′0A2 − α00/θ00
)
=
θ00
(
α′0A2 − η00
)
. Using (28), this expression can be further rewritten as θ00A
2 (α′0 − α0/θ0)
which is negative given our assumptions on the function αi (θi). Thus, to prove that
dˆθ0/dˆθ00 > 0, we need to show that the numerator at the right-hand side of (31) is posi-
tive. To compute dθ1/dθ00, we first rewrite (25) as
α1
θ1
− α00x
θ00
= 0.
It follows that
dθ1
dθ00
=
θ1
θ00
α′00θ00
α00
− 1
α′1θ1
α1
− 1
. (32)
We confirm that dθ1/dθ00 > 0 since α
′
00θ00 − α00 < 0 and α′1θ1 − α1 < 0. Using (25) and
(32), the numerator at the right-hand side of (31) becomes
A
2
α0
α′1θ1 1− α
′
00θ00
α00
1− α′1θ1α1
− θ00α′00
+ α0A2 − α′00θ0. (33)
Consider the last term in (33), α0A
2−α′00θ0. Use (28) to rewrite it as θ0 (α00 − θ00α′00) /θ00
which is positive. Consider the term in brackets. Notice that α′iθi/αi < 1 always holds
since αi is concave. If α
′
iθi/αi is weakly increasing in θi, it follows that 1− α′00θ00/α00 ≥
1−α′1θ1/α1, and α′00θ00 < α′1θ1 since α00 < α1. In this case the term in brackets is unam-
biguously positive. If α′iθi/αi is instead decreasing in θi, notice that, for x→ 1, θ00 → θ1
and hence the term is brackets tends to zero. Therefore, since αi is a continuous function,
if x is sufficiently high the overall expression in (33) is positive. We conclude that for x
sufficiently high the numerator in (31) is always positive and therefore dˆθ0/dˆθ00 > 0.
Since dθ0/dθ00 < 0 while dˆθ0/dˆθ00 > 0, we need to show that the intercept value of
θ0 that solves (27) for θ00 → 0 is greater than the intercept value of θ0 that solves (28)
for θ00 → 0. This will ensure that the curves defined in (27) and (28) intersect for some
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θ00, θ0 > 0. Notice that when θ00 = 0 then α00 = 0 and η00 = 1, which given (25) implies
that η1 = x < 1 and hence α1 > 0.
When θ00 = 0, (27) gives
α0 (θ0) =
4k/x{
1 +
[
α1
(
η−11 (x)
)]
/4
}2 , (34)
while (28) gives
η0 (θ0) =
1{
1 +
[
α1
(
η−11 (x)
)]
/4
}2 . (35)
Consider three cases regarding the value of x and k; i.e., x = 4k, x > 4k and 2k ≤ x <
4k (notice that any equilibrium requires x ≥ 2k). First consider the right-hand sides in
(34) and (35) for 4k/x = 1 and the maximum value of x; i.e., x → 1. In this case, when
θ00 = 0, it follows that η00 = η1 = 1, so that θ1 = θ00 = 0 and thus α1 = 0. Hence the
right-hand side in (34) becomes equal to 1, which implies that the value of θ0 that solves
(34) is θ0 → ∞. Similarly, the right-hand side in (35) becomes equal to 1 which implies
that the value of θ0 that solves (35) is θ0 = 0. Therefore, for the extreme case x→ 1, the
intercept value of θ0 that solves (27) is greater than the intercept value of θ0 that solves
(28) for θ00 → 0. It follows that for x < 1 sufficiently high, when θ00 = 0 then η1 satisfies
η1 < η00 = 1 and is sufficiently high, hence θ1 is sufficiently low, and α1 is sufficiently low
as well. Therefore the denominators in the right-hand sides of (34) and (35) are relatively
small, and so the right-hand sides in (34) and (35) are relatively big, which ensures that
the value of θ0 that solves (34) (or (27) for θ00 = 0) is greater than the value of θ0 that
solves (35) (or (28) for θ00 = 0). We deduce that there is some xˆ such that if x ≥ xˆ then
the value of θ0 that solves (34) is higher than the value of θ0 that solves (35), and a unique
solution for θ0, θ00 > 0 exists. Second, consider the case 4k < x. For x → 1, the value of
θ0 that solves (35) is θ0 = 0 as in the previous case, while the value of θ0 that solves (34)
is θ0 > 0. Therefore, similarly as for 4k = x, there is some xˆ such that if x ≥ xˆ then the
value of θ0 that solves (34) is higher than the value of θ0 that solves (35), and a unique
solution θ0, θ00 > exists. Finally, consider the case 4k > x ≥ 2k. In this case, there is no
value of θ0 that yields α0 ≤ 1 for x→ 1 and θ00 = 0 in (35): k is big relative to x, so even
if x = 1 (and also if x < 1), there is no θ0 that makes sellers enter if θ00 = 0. Hence there
must be some θ00 > 0 such that α0 = 1 (and so θ0 →∞) and the free-entry condition (27)
holds. In the buyers’ indifference condition (28), however, when θ0 → ∞ we have that
η0 = 0 and hence it must be that θ00 also approaches infinity. Therefore the two curves
defined by (27) and (28) must intersect for θ0, θ00 > 0, and hence an equilibrium solution
θ0, θ00 > 0 exists.
In what follows we show that an increase in k decreases buyers’ expected utility (sell-
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ers’ free entry condition ensures that sellers’ expected utility is always zero). Totally
differentiate (27) with respect to k
4
x
= α′0A
2dθ0
dk
+
[
α0α
′
1
A
2
dθ1
dθ00
+ α′00
(
1− α0A
2
)]
dθ00
dk
(36)
where again A = 1 + (α1 − α00) /4. Equation (36) shows that at least one of the two
derivatives dθ0/dk and dθ00/dk must be positive.
Rewrite (26) as follows
α0θ00
(
1 +
α1 − α00
4
)2
− α00θ0 = 0
Totally differentiate with respect to k to obtain
(
α′0θ00A
2 − α00
) dθ0
dk
+
[
α0A
2 + α0θ00
A
2
(
α′1
dθ1
dθ00
− α′00
)
− θ0α′00
]
dθ00
dk
= 0 (37)
Combining (36) and (37), we obtain
dθ00
dk
=
4
x
(
α0
θ0α′0
− 1
)
(α0)
2
(
1+
α1−α00
4
)
θ0α′0
α′1
dθ1
dθ00
−α′00
2 +
(
α0
θ0α′0
− 1
)
α′00 +
θ0
θ00
(
α00
θ00
− α′00
) (38)
On the right-hand side in (38), the numerator is positive, thus if the denominator is
also positive then dθ00/dk > 0. Notice that the denominator is positive if
θ00
(α0)
2A
θ0α′0
α′1
dθ1
dθ00
− α′00
2
+ θ00
(
α0
θ0α′0
− 1
)
α′00 + θ0
(
α00
θ00
− α′00
)
> 0 (39)
To show that (39) holds, recall that existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium re-
quired that the overall term in (33) or equivalently the numerator on the right-hand side
of (31) to be positive. By subtracting the numerator on the right-hand side of (31) from
the term on the left-hand side of (39) and rearranging, we obtain the following condition
for the denominator on the right-hand side in (38) to be positive
α0
A
2
α′1
dθ1
dθ00
+ α′00
(
1− α0A
2
)
> 0 (40)
which holds since α0A/2 < 1. It follows that in the defined equilibrium dθ00/dk > 0,
which implies that buyers’ expected utility of searching in market 00 decreases with k:
since θ00 increases η00 decreases with k, while p00 = x/2 does not change with k. Since
buyers’ expected utility must be the same across markets in equilibrium, buyers’ expected
27
utility of searching in the three markets decreases with k.
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Appendix B. Regressions
Table 9: Rome. Dependent variable: average daily rate (log) (≥ 10 bkngs)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bathrooms 0.216∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗
(0.00899) (0.00898) (0.00902) (0.00902) (0.00885) (0.00887)
Max Guests 0.0786∗∗∗ 0.0788∗∗∗ 0.0804∗∗∗ 0.0787∗∗∗ 0.0758∗∗∗ 0.0758∗∗∗
(0.00275) (0.00275) (0.00275) (0.00277) (0.00271) (0.00271)
superhost2 0.0378∗∗ 0.00400 0.00197 0.0254∗ 0.0256∗
(0.0115) (0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0118) (0.0118)
Overall Rating 0.124∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗
(0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0115) (0.0115)
Number of Photos 0.00134∗∗∗ 0.00176∗∗∗ 0.00174∗∗∗
(0.000297) (0.000292) (0.000294)
Number of Reviews -0.00139∗∗∗ -0.00139∗∗∗
(0.000103) (0.000104)
instantbook 0.00297
(0.00789)
Constant 4.022∗∗∗ 4.019∗∗∗ 3.549∗∗∗ 3.553∗∗∗ 3.579∗∗∗ 3.578∗∗∗
(0.0669) (0.0668) (0.0750) (0.0748) (0.0732) (0.0733)
Observations 4169 4169 3978 3971 3971 3971
Adjusted R2 0.525 0.526 0.544 0.546 0.566 0.566
Standard errors in parentheses
These are OLS regressions. Each regression controls for neighborhood.
Source: Authors’ calculations from AIRDNA data
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 10: Rome. Dependent variable: occupancy rate (≥ 10 bkngs)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bathrooms 0.0191∗∗ 0.0197∗∗ 0.0195∗∗ 0.0171∗∗ 0.0178∗∗ 0.0191∗∗
(0.00663) (0.00648) (0.00653) (0.00647) (0.00591) (0.00592)
Max Guests 0.00465∗ 0.00606∗∗ 0.00819∗∗∗ 0.00631∗∗ 0.00550∗∗ 0.00548∗∗
(0.00208) (0.00203) (0.00205) (0.00205) (0.00187) (0.00187)
logadr -0.182∗∗∗ -0.190∗∗∗ -0.209∗∗∗ -0.215∗∗∗ -0.157∗∗∗ -0.157∗∗∗
(0.0107) (0.0105) (0.0108) (0.0107) (0.0100) (0.0100)
superhost2 0.111∗∗∗ 0.0765∗∗∗ 0.0726∗∗∗ 0.0412∗∗∗ 0.0423∗∗∗
(0.00778) (0.00812) (0.00806) (0.00745) (0.00745)
Overall Rating 0.0953∗∗∗ 0.0888∗∗∗ 0.0710∗∗∗ 0.0709∗∗∗
(0.00803) (0.00800) (0.00734) (0.00733)
Number of Photos 0.00184∗∗∗ 0.00120∗∗∗ 0.00113∗∗∗
(0.000200) (0.000184) (0.000185)
Number of Reviews 0.00185∗∗∗ 0.00183∗∗∗
(0.0000663) (0.0000666)
instantbook 0.0170∗∗∗
(0.00496)
Constant 1.419∗∗∗ 1.441∗∗∗ 1.116∗∗∗ 1.128∗∗∗ 0.885∗∗∗ 0.878∗∗∗
(0.0633) (0.0618) (0.0636) (0.0632) (0.0584) (0.0583)
Observations 4169 4169 3978 3971 3971 3971
Adjusted R2 0.091 0.133 0.161 0.178 0.313 0.315
Standard errors in parentheses
These are OLS regressions. Each regression controls for neighborhood.
Source: Authors’ calculations from AIRDNA data
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 11: Rome. Dependent variable: annual revenue (log) (≥ 10 bkngs)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bathrooms 0.140∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗
(0.0217) (0.0212) (0.0216) (0.0214) (0.0172) (0.0172)
Max Guests 0.0500∗∗∗ 0.0529∗∗∗ 0.0548∗∗∗ 0.0459∗∗∗ 0.0652∗∗∗ 0.0651∗∗∗
(0.00664) (0.00649) (0.00657) (0.00655) (0.00526) (0.00525)
superhost2 0.387∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗
(0.0272) (0.0286) (0.0283) (0.0229) (0.0229)
Overall Rating 0.273∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗
(0.0279) (0.0278) (0.0223) (0.0222)
Number of Photos 0.00684∗∗∗ 0.00403∗∗∗ 0.00376∗∗∗
(0.000702) (0.000566) (0.000568)
Number of Reviews 0.00939∗∗∗ 0.00931∗∗∗
(0.000200) (0.000200)
instantbook 0.0617∗∗∗
(0.0153)
Constant 9.009∗∗∗ 8.977∗∗∗ 7.919∗∗∗ 7.930∗∗∗ 7.752∗∗∗ 7.724∗∗∗
(0.162) (0.158) (0.179) (0.177) (0.142) (0.142)
Observations 4169 4169 3978 3971 3971 3971
Adjusted R2 0.081 0.123 0.142 0.160 0.461 0.463
Standard errors in parentheses
These are OLS regressions. Each regression controls for neighborhood.
Source: Authors’ calculations from AIRDNA data
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 12: San Francisco. Dependent variable: average daily rate (log) (≥ 10 bkngs)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bathrooms 0.296∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗
(0.0191) (0.0189) (0.0186) (0.0187) (0.0186) (0.0187)
Max Guests 0.0877∗∗∗ 0.0897∗∗∗ 0.0933∗∗∗ 0.0887∗∗∗ 0.0880∗∗∗ 0.0884∗∗∗
(0.00400) (0.00397) (0.00390) (0.00399) (0.00396) (0.00400)
superhost2 0.107∗∗∗ 0.0641∗∗∗ 0.0516∗∗ 0.0660∗∗∗ 0.0660∗∗∗
(0.0167) (0.0169) (0.0168) (0.0169) (0.0169)
Overall Rating 0.214∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗
(0.0208) (0.0209) (0.0208) (0.0210)
Number of Photos 0.00383∗∗∗ 0.00449∗∗∗ 0.00450∗∗∗
(0.000591) (0.000601) (0.000601)
Number of Reviews -0.000840∗∗∗ -0.000829∗∗∗
(0.000160) (0.000161)
instantbook -0.0112
(0.0172)
Constant 4.739∗∗∗ 4.718∗∗∗ 3.724∗∗∗ 3.700∗∗∗ 3.730∗∗∗ 3.740∗∗∗
(0.0228) (0.0228) (0.0992) (0.0995) (0.0990) (0.100)
Observations 2069 2069 2029 1995 1995 1995
Adjusted R2 0.583 0.591 0.614 0.620 0.625 0.625
Standard errors in parentheses
These are OLS regressions. Each regression controls for neighborhood and city.
Source: Authors’ calculations from AIRDNA data
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 13: San Francisco. Dependent variable: occupancy rate (≥ 10 bkngs)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bathrooms 0.0159 0.0179 0.0188 0.0175 0.0240∗ 0.0259∗
(0.0123) (0.0122) (0.0122) (0.0124) (0.0119) (0.0119)
Max Guests 0.00508 0.00762∗∗ 0.0116∗∗∗ 0.0100∗∗∗ 0.00913∗∗∗ 0.00748∗∗
(0.00271) (0.00270) (0.00276) (0.00281) (0.00270) (0.00270)
logadr -0.153∗∗∗ -0.167∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗ -0.193∗∗∗ -0.172∗∗∗ -0.171∗∗∗
(0.0136) (0.0136) (0.0140) (0.0143) (0.0138) (0.0137)
superhost2 0.0726∗∗∗ 0.0576∗∗∗ 0.0536∗∗∗ 0.0306∗∗ 0.0304∗∗
(0.0103) (0.0105) (0.0106) (0.0103) (0.0103)
Overall Rating 0.0729∗∗∗ 0.0729∗∗∗ 0.0692∗∗∗ 0.0780∗∗∗
(0.0133) (0.0135) (0.0129) (0.0130)
Number of Photos 0.00158∗∗∗ 0.000489 0.000466
(0.000376) (0.000370) (0.000368)
Number of Reviews 0.00128∗∗∗ 0.00123∗∗∗
(0.0000981) (0.0000980)
instantbook 0.0500∗∗∗
(0.0104)
Constant 1.474∗∗∗ 1.524∗∗∗ 1.281∗∗∗ 1.295∗∗∗ 1.170∗∗∗ 1.121∗∗∗
(0.0659) (0.0655) (0.0809) (0.0820) (0.0792) (0.0794)
Observations 2069 2069 2029 1995 1995 1995
Adjusted R2 0.097 0.119 0.132 0.138 0.207 0.216
Standard errors in parentheses
These are OLS regressions. Each regression controls for neighborhood and city.
Source: Authors’ calculations from AIRDNA data
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 14: San Francisco. Dependent variable: annual revenue (log) (≥ 10 bkngs)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bathrooms 0.201∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗ 0.247∗∗∗
(0.0479) (0.0469) (0.0476) (0.0476) (0.0406) (0.0406)
Max Guests 0.0828∗∗∗ 0.0901∗∗∗ 0.0966∗∗∗ 0.0831∗∗∗ 0.0904∗∗∗ 0.0874∗∗∗
(0.0100) (0.00985) (0.00999) (0.0101) (0.00863) (0.00870)
superhost2 0.390∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗
(0.0415) (0.0432) (0.0428) (0.0369) (0.0369)
Overall Rating 0.178∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗
(0.0533) (0.0532) (0.0453) (0.0457)
Number of Photos 0.0133∗∗∗ 0.00585∗∗∗ 0.00581∗∗∗
(0.00150) (0.00131) (0.00131)
Number of Reviews 0.00950∗∗∗ 0.00941∗∗∗
(0.000349) (0.000351)
instantbook 0.0934∗
(0.0375)
Constant 9.515∗∗∗ 9.440∗∗∗ 8.614∗∗∗ 8.573∗∗∗ 8.227∗∗∗ 8.142∗∗∗
(0.0571) (0.0565) (0.254) (0.253) (0.216) (0.218)
Observations 2069 2069 2029 1995 1995 1995
Adjusted R2 0.161 0.196 0.205 0.238 0.449 0.450
Standard errors in parentheses
These are OLS regressions. Each regression controls for neighborhood and city.
Source: Authors’ calculations from AIRDNA data
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 15: Miami. Dependent variable: average daily rate (log) (≥ 10 bkngs)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bathrooms 0.345∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗∗ 0.352∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗ 0.324∗∗∗
(0.0137) (0.0137) (0.0136) (0.0134) (0.0130) (0.0130)
Max Guests 0.0947∗∗∗ 0.0953∗∗∗ 0.0977∗∗∗ 0.0933∗∗∗ 0.0901∗∗∗ 0.0897∗∗∗
(0.00354) (0.00355) (0.00351) (0.00351) (0.00339) (0.00340)
superhost2 0.0456∗∗ 0.0329 0.0202 0.0562∗∗∗ 0.0561∗∗∗
(0.0176) (0.0175) (0.0173) (0.0169) (0.0169)
Overall Rating 0.0960∗∗∗ 0.0886∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗
(0.0128) (0.0127) (0.0122) (0.0122)
Number of Photos 0.00356∗∗∗ 0.00433∗∗∗ 0.00430∗∗∗
(0.000381) (0.000370) (0.000370)
Number of Reviews -0.00316∗∗∗ -0.00319∗∗∗
(0.000183) (0.000183)
instantbook 0.0187
(0.0111)
Constant 3.968∗∗∗ 3.960∗∗∗ 3.474∗∗∗ 3.488∗∗∗ 3.509∗∗∗ 3.503∗∗∗
(0.0428) (0.0429) (0.0731) (0.0723) (0.0697) (0.0698)
Observations 4261 4261 4034 4032 4032 4032
Adjusted R2 0.454 0.455 0.492 0.502 0.537 0.537
Standard errors in parentheses
These are OLS regressions. Each regression controls for city.
Source: Authors’ calculations from AIRDNA data
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 16: Miami. Dependent variable: occupancy rate (≥ 10 bkngs)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bathrooms 0.0501∗∗∗ 0.0517∗∗∗ 0.0509∗∗∗ 0.0501∗∗∗ 0.0478∗∗∗ 0.0522∗∗∗
(0.00697) (0.00690) (0.00710) (0.00704) (0.00681) (0.00674)
Max Guests -0.00152 -0.000217 0.00366∗ 0.00275 0.00114 0.000237
(0.00181) (0.00180) (0.00186) (0.00185) (0.00179) (0.00177)
logadr -0.203∗∗∗ -0.206∗∗∗ -0.222∗∗∗ -0.231∗∗∗ -0.197∗∗∗ -0.199∗∗∗
(0.00727) (0.00721) (0.00765) (0.00768) (0.00769) (0.00760)
superhost2 0.0784∗∗∗ 0.0595∗∗∗ 0.0547∗∗∗ 0.0363∗∗∗ 0.0363∗∗∗
(0.00827) (0.00848) (0.00843) (0.00822) (0.00812)
Overall Rating 0.0597∗∗∗ 0.0574∗∗∗ 0.0483∗∗∗ 0.0498∗∗∗
(0.00623) (0.00619) (0.00600) (0.00593)
Number of Photos 0.00150∗∗∗ 0.000995∗∗∗ 0.000904∗∗∗
(0.000187) (0.000183) (0.000181)
Number of Reviews 0.00156∗∗∗ 0.00148∗∗∗
(0.0000923) (0.0000915)
instantbook 0.0532∗∗∗
(0.00536)
Constant 1.488∗∗∗ 1.485∗∗∗ 1.260∗∗∗ 1.298∗∗∗ 1.169∗∗∗ 1.160∗∗∗
(0.0353) (0.0349) (0.0443) (0.0442) (0.0434) (0.0429)
Observations 4261 4261 4034 4032 4032 4032
Adjusted R2 0.205 0.222 0.239 0.251 0.300 0.317
Standard errors in parentheses
These are OLS regressions. Each regression controls for city.
Source: Authors’ calculations from AIRDNA data
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 17: Miami. Dependent variable: annual revenue (log) (≥ 10 bkngs)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bathrooms 0.294∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗∗ 0.313∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗
(0.0232) (0.0230) (0.0236) (0.0232) (0.0209) (0.0209)
Max Guests 0.0489∗∗∗ 0.0527∗∗∗ 0.0608∗∗∗ 0.0513∗∗∗ 0.0606∗∗∗ 0.0597∗∗∗
(0.00598) (0.00594) (0.00611) (0.00605) (0.00544) (0.00545)
superhost2 0.280∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ 0.0873∗∗ 0.0872∗∗
(0.0295) (0.0304) (0.0299) (0.0271) (0.0270)
Overall Rating 0.154∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗
(0.0222) (0.0218) (0.0196) (0.0196)
Number of Photos 0.00765∗∗∗ 0.00542∗∗∗ 0.00533∗∗∗
(0.000657) (0.000594) (0.000594)
Number of Reviews 0.00915∗∗∗ 0.00909∗∗∗
(0.000293) (0.000294)
instantbook 0.0456∗
(0.0179)
Constant 8.687∗∗∗ 8.638∗∗∗ 7.909∗∗∗ 7.940∗∗∗ 7.880∗∗∗ 7.867∗∗∗
(0.0724) (0.0718) (0.127) (0.125) (0.112) (0.112)
Observations 4261 4261 4034 4032 4032 4032
Adjusted R2 0.156 0.174 0.190 0.216 0.369 0.369
Standard errors in parentheses
These are OLS regressions. Each regression controls for city.
Source: Authors’ calculations from AIRDNA data
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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